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Abstract—Due to the globalization in the semiconductor supply
chain, counterfeit dynamic random-access memory (DRAM)
chips/modules have been spreading worldwide at an alarming
rate. Deploying counterfeit DRAM modules into an electronic
system can have severe consequences on security and reliability
domains because of their sub-standard quality, poor performance,
and shorter life span. Besides, studies suggest that a counterfeit
DRAM can be more vulnerable to sophisticated attacks. However,
detecting counterfeit DRAMs is very challenging because of their
nature and ability to pass the initial testing. In this paper, we
propose a technique to identify the DRAM origin (i.e., the origin
of the manufacturer and the specification of individual DRAM)
to detect and prevent counterfeit DRAM modules. A silicon
evaluation shows that the proposed method reliably identifies
off-the-shelf DRAM modules from three major manufacturers.
Index Terms—Manufacturer identification, IC forgery, DRAM
forgery, DRAM counterfeiting, Anti-counterfeiting, Counterfeit
memory.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the globalization of the semiconductor supply chain
and the growth of the semiconductor market value, counterfeit
integrated circuits (ICs) have become an established threat to
the semiconductor community [1]–[5]. Counterfeit electronic
parts and the risks associated with them have been increasing
rapidly, which is reflected in the recent news [1]–[4]. Many
commercially available memory chips are fabricated worldwide
in untrusted facilities and, therefore, a counterfeit memory
chip/module can easily enter into the supply chain in different
formats: recycled, re-marked, tampered, out-of-spec, forged-
documented, defective, cloned, overproduced etc. [1], [2], [6]–
[9]. Recent studies show that the global market share of
counterfeit IC is worth $169 billion, and ∼ 17% of which
is contributed by memory chips [2], [6].
The inclusion of counterfeit components in an electronic
system can endanger personal and national privacy, sabotage
critical infrastructure, and damage the viability of entire
business sectors because of their sub-standard quality, poor
performance, and a shorter life-span [1], [6]–[9]. A counterfeit
chip can fail any time after being deployed in the system, or
they can be exploited to leak sensitive information or to allow
remote access and endanger the integrity, confidentiality, and
safety of a system by performing invasive or non-invasive fault-
injection attacks [10], [11]. Furthermore, recent experimental
studies suggest that some DRAM modules are more vulnerable
to rowhammer attack, a method of changing the restricted
memory contents by repeated access to their adjacent rows
[11], because of their poor resiliency against noise, interference,
etc.
A single solution to detect or prevent counterfeiting is
unrealistic because of the diversity of counterfeit types, sources,
and refinement techniques [1], [7]–[9]. Several discrete coun-
termeasures have been proposed by the industry and academic
researchers, which can be categorized into two major types:
(i) electrical-based testing and (ii) physical-inspection based
testing [1], [2], [6]–[9]. Some solutions are applicable to chips
that are already in the market, and some solutions are integrated
with the original chips for future tracking or metering [1], [2],
[6]–[9]. Most of the solutions are ineffective for memory chips
because they might require expensive equipment, expensive
testing set-up, maintenance of an expensive database, and
exhaustive enrollment process [2], [6], [12]. Besides, most
physical-inspection based solutions are invasive and therefore,
not applicable for mass-volume detection [2]. For mass-volume
verification and low-cost testing, electrical-based testing is
required that is non-invasive [6]. However, a non-invasive
solution for counterfeit DRAM identification is extremely
difficult because they may remain functional at the time of
purchase and pass standard product qualification tests. Also,
most existing solutions focus on a single counterfeit type
(e.g., detecting recycled chips) [1], [2], [12]. Furthermore,
current extensive regulations require a series of expensive
testing methodologies [2], [6]. Therefore, a proper solution is
required to identify counterfeit memory chips before deploying
them in mission-, safety-, and security-critical systems.
In this paper, we propose a machine-learning-based technique
to identify the origin of a DRAM manufacturer along with
DRAM specification (i.e., density, grade, etc., see Sec. III for
details) by exploiting DRAM latency (the required time to
move charge from one location to another location in DRAM
[13]–[16]) variations to detect and prevent major counterfeit
types. The major contributions of this paper include:
• We propose a framework to identify the origin of the
DRAM manufacturer by exploiting the facts that the
architectural, layout, and manufacturing process variations
are reflected in latency variations. The framework is also
capable of verifying specification of individual DRAM
module.
• We extract the most appropriate features from the latency-
based erroneous patterns in DRAM modules to amplify
the variations among manufacturers and specifications.
• We propose a machine learning approach to determine
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the origin of the DRAM manufacturer based on the
extracted features. The same method also separates DRAM
modules of different specifications that are from the same
manufacturer.
• We validate our proposed framework with off-the-shelf
memory modules (commercial grade) from three major
manufacturers- Micron, Samsung, and SK Hynix [17].
• We validate the robustness of our proposed technique
against temperature and voltage variations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we present the background of DRAM architecture, read/write
operation, low-latency induced errors. We also present a set
of motivations for our proposed framework in Section II. We
highlight our major objectives and necessary assumptions in
Section III. We propose the manufacturer identification frame-
work in Section IV. The experimental results are presented and
discussed in Section V. We highlight the major limitations and
the scopes of our proposed work in Section VI. We conclude
our article in Section VII.
II. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATIONS
A. DRAM Architecture and Latency Variations
A DRAM system can have one module or several modules
depending on the memory requirement. A DRAM module is
divided into one or multiple ranks [13], [18], [19]. Each rank
consists of several DRAM chips; and together, they provide a
wide data-bus (usually 64 bits). The DRAM memory structure
is analogous to a 2-D memory cell array. For simplicity, we
can consider that each bit of the 64-bit word comes from 64
individual cell arrays. The rows of the DRAM are known as
wordline (or page). The columns are known as bitline, and the
chip density determines the total number of rows. The bitlines
are connected to the row-buffer, a series of sense-amplifiers.
Several DRAM cells are connected to a wordline. A DRAM
cell consists of two components- an access transistor and a
capacitor to hold the charge. The access transistor connects the
capacitor with a bitline and is controlled by the wordline. The
state of charge in the capacitor determines the memory content
(i.e., ‘1’ or ‘0’). Depending on the memory architecture, DRAM
memory cells can be categorized into true-cell and anti-cell
[19]. A true-cell stores logic ‘1 with a fully charged capacitor
and ‘0’ with an empty capacitor. On the other hand, an anti-cell
stores ‘0’ with a fully charged capacitor and ‘1’ with an empty
state. However, the stored charge in the capacitor leaks away,
which leads to an incorrect reading after a certain amount of
time. So, to ensure the integrity, the content of a DRAM cell
needs to be refreshed periodically before the memory contents
flip. This time interval is known as the Retention time, which
is 32 or 64 milliseconds (ms) [18]. A failure to refresh before
the retention time can alter the memory content.
To write/access the cell content, the column (or bitline)
voltage need to be initiated at a specific reference voltage
(Vref = VDD2 ). Fig. 1 presents a simplified version of DRAM
read operation. A read operation starts with an ACTIVATE
(ACT) command executed by the memory controller. tRCD
is called the Activation latency which is required to activate
(turn ‘ON’) the access transistor properly. The activated access
transistor creates a conducting path between the storage
ACT READ PRE ACT
Command Line
Data Bus
tRCD
Accessed DATA
tCL tRP
tRAS
Fig. 1: DRAM timing at reading cycle [13].
capacitor and the bitline. The charge stored in the capacitor
perturbs the bitline voltage. The sense-amplifier senses the
perturbed voltage and amplifies it to an appropriate binary
value. At this moment, the memory controller applies the
READ command to read the data and fetch it to the data bus.
The minimum time latency between the READ command and
the first data bit to appear in data-bus is called Column Access
Strobe latency or CAS latency (tCL). DRAM’s read operation
is a destructive process. Therefore, the charge on the DRAM
storage capacitor needs to be restored after each successful
reading. The time required to activate an access transistor and
to restore the charge on the corresponding storage capacitor is
known as the Row Active latency or Restoration latency (tRAS).
At the end of the restoration process, the memory controller
again applies the PRE command to re-initiate all the bitlines for
the next read/write operation. The PRE command precharges
all bitlines to Vref . The time required to precharge all bitlines
properly is called Precharge Time (tRP ). The PRE command
also deactivates all previously activated access transistor. The
tRAS + tRP is the total time required to read a DRAM row
properly; this total time is called Row Cycle Time (tRC).
Usually, the DRAM manufacturer specifies a set of timing
parameters for reliable read and write operation [18]. At the
reduced timing latency below the standard value, we experience
unreliable read and write operations, which is different from
one module to another [13], [14], [18]. In our proposed method,
we capture the architectural, layout and manufacturing process
variations by exploiting the errors originated at the reduced
Activation latency (tRCD).
B. Counterfeit, Existing Work, and Motivations
The modern horizontal semiconductor supply chains involve
several parties to reduce the fabrication cost and time to market
[1], [2], [6], [20], [21]. In this model, a chip is designed in
one place while fabricated in a different place. Because of
traveling IPs in different formats and involvement of untrusted
parties, the modern semiconductor supply chain suffers from
counterfeiting (such as hardware trojan or malicious change in
third-party IP or chip layout, cloning IPs/ICs, remarking, etc.)
[1], [5], [21], [22]. Fig. 2 shows the IC/DRAM design flow for
authentic-chip and pirated-chip production cycle. The untrusted
party (the third-party IP developer, the foundry, the assembly,
the distributor, etc.) can perform counterfeiting at different
phases of the manufacturing process. An untrusted party can
send out overproduced, and out-of-spec/defective ICs/DRAM
chips to the market. The untrusted party also can clone the
original chip by stealing IPs or by reverse-engineering (from
a post-fabricated product) to avoid research and development
(R&D) costs. Recycled ICs also can be added to the supply
chain at different stages (e.g., in the foundry or the assembly).
Below, we summarize (but not limited to) the motivations of
our proposed work.
Synthesis
Layout Design
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→ Fab. → Test
Reverse Engineering
RTL
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Fig. 2: (a) Authentic-chip production cycle vs. (b)
counterfeit-chip production cycle [21].
i) Existing countermeasures and their limitations: In
2015, the Department of Defense imposed several rules to
stop entering counterfeit components in the defense supply
chain [6]. These rules create more accountability and require
proper testing standards along with maintaining a database
if the electronic components are acquired from the untrusted
party. Researchers, industries, and several organizations have
developed several test plans or standards that require a series
of testing methods. Visual inspection, X-ray imaging, scanning
electron microscopy (SEM), energy disruptive spectroscopy,
terahertz spectroscopy, etc., are the most common physical
inspection-based techniques that are used to detect counterfeit
chips [1], [7]–[9]. Some imaging techniques capture the internal
features of a sample and might be very effective to identify
certain counterfeit types. However, these physical inspection-
based techniques usually require expensive tool, long test time
for sample collection and imaging, subject matter experts [1].
Curve trace testing (CTT), parameter testing, burn-in testing,
aging-based analysis, etc. are the most common electrical test
methods that can be used to identify counterfeit components
[23], [24]. Existing burn-in and aging analysis-based techniques
partially destructive because months to years of the device are
consumed from the accelerated aging. The parameter testing
is useful but requires expensive test setup and complex test
programs. On the other hand, the CTT (electrical testing to
capture damaged packages, broken or damaged wires, cracked
die, etc.) is only useful for detecting recycled ICs [2], [6].
Researchers also have proposed pre-fabrication techniques
to prevent counterfeiting such as hardware metering ([1], [25]),
secure split test (SST) ([5]), placing on-chip sensors ([2], [23],
[24], [26]), electronic chip ID ([1]), DNA marking ([27]), RFID-
based tracking ([28]), blockchain-based traceability ([29]), PUF-
based techniques ([10], [14], [30]–[33]), etc. Hardware metering
and SST are used to provide post-fabrication control but require
hardware changes and complex supply chain management.
Besides, each of the chips needs to go through the unlocking
process, which is tedious and adds extra steps in the supply
chain. On the other hand, on-chip sensors are used to monitor
the device degradation but need some additional sensors and
monitoring units. ECID tags each chip with a unique ID by
adding some non-programmable memory (such as OTP or
ROM). The ECID-based solution is susceptible to tampering.
In DNA marking technique, a mixed plant DNA is used to
create a new DNA sequence [27]. Later, this sequence is applied
with the ink to mark the chip package. However, this technique
suffers from a complex authentication scheme. For the PUF-
based technique, the unique ID generated from each chip
can be used to identify authentic chip. However, the PUF-
based techniques require an extensive database for registration
purposes. The registration and authentication procedures are
exhaustive as well. The DRAM memory itself can be used as
a PUF, but the uniqueness of PUF can make the solution very
challenging. Moreover, most of the existing solutions address
a single counterfeit type.
Our proposed machine-learning based technique has some
advantages compared to other possible manufacturer identifica-
tion techniques:
• In the proposed machine-learning based technique, we
store minimal information (a few statistical parameters) to
attest and detect a large group of memory modules/chips.
On the other hand, for example, in PUF-based technique,
we need to create a golden/reference dataset by accumulat-
ing all challenge-response pairs for an individual memory
module/chip.
• Our proposed technique does not need any exhaustive
registration processes. Analyzing a small number of
samples from a large group of modules is sufficient enough
to reveal the detail statistical information of that group.
• Furthermore, the machine-learning based technique can
serve some particular purpose; for example, the user might
want to test the authenticity of the purchased device
without knowing any details of chip design. In such a
case, the user does not need to have exclusive access
to any sensitive information (e.g., the challenge-response
database of PUF-based scheme).
• This technique does not require any hardware modifica-
tion unlike many existing techniques such as: hardware
metering, SST, on-chip sensor-based authentication, ECID,
etc. [1].
• The proposed solution is invasive and less expensive
compared to some other techniques.
ii) Importance of attesting the DRAM origin: Attesting
the origin of the foundry or the manufacturer is a critical
need to (a) enforce the license agreement, (b) ensure and track
the quality of the chip, (c) rank the manufacturer based on
the quality and durability of their products, (d) protect the
intellectual property, (e) ensure accountability, and (f) stop the
spread of counterfeit memory chips worldwide. Counterfeiters
usually hide the origin of the foundry, fake the quality of the
original memory modules/chips, and infringe on the rights of
the original manufacturer [3]–[5], [7]–[9]. On the other hand,
verification of individual DRAM module’s specification can
detect certain counterfeit types such as upgrading a DRAM
module through remarking or forged documentation.
The existing techniques on attesting of the foundry rely on
simulation or test data from fabrication and packaging facilities
[7], [8]. Unfortunately, in most cases, the testing data are not
made publicly available and, therefore, a party that does not
have access to those test data cannot make the classifier and (or)
cannot verify the ratified foundry. In contrast, in our proposed
technique, the DRAM chips can be authenticated based on
trained classifier provided by the manufacturer or a trusted
third party. In the proposed technique, the verifier does not
require any prior knowledge of the manufacturing process. The
classifier input, a set of features, can be easily evaluated in
any low-cost embedded or FPGA-based system.
iii) Vulnerability of counterfeit memory chips: A counter-
feit memory module can be more vulnerable to attacks because
of their less resiliency against noise. For example, recent studies
demonstrate that some DRAM modules possess inferior quality
than others, which are more susceptible to rowhammer attack
[11]. Our experimental results also suggest that a recycled
DRAM chip is ∼ 8% more vulnerable to rowhammer attack.
iv) Modification of serial presence detect (SPD) infor-
mation: DRAM manufacturers provide the information of all
DRAM timing parameters in a small read-only memory (ROM)
which is integrated with the DRAM module [34]. It has been
demonstrated that a counterfeiter can modify this information
(aka SPD information) to make a DRAM authentic or superior
[35]. These DRAM chips can pass the initial test but can
cause critical failure of the system during runtime under some
operating conditions that are considered safe [36].
III. OBJECTIVES AND ASSUMPTIONS
The objective of this work is to identify the DRAM origin
(i.e., the origin of the manufacturer and the specification
of individual DRAM) reliably by capturing all variabilities.
The major variations to attest and identify the origin of the
manufacturer include:
• Architectural variations: Manufacturers usually opti-
mize the DRAM architecture in various ways to support
the specifications and product cost [37], [38]. For example,
manufacturers shrink the die size to reduce the cost per
cell, which can cause the DRAM more susceptible to
noise, more vulnerable, and less robust. The minimum
required latency parameters vary from one architecture
to another. Therefore, for a given reduced timing latency,
DRAMs from different manufacturers create a different
amount of errors [13], [14], [38].
• Layout variations: Chip layout variation from one man-
ufacturer to another may originate from several sources
such as chip area, floorplanning, placement, and routing,
etc. [38], [39]. This layout variation may affect different
electrical characteristics such as RC path delay, power
utilization (I2R loss), noise margin, etc., which can be
reflected in the DRAM latency parameters [13], [14].
• Process variations: The intrinsic process variation can
be either random or systematic [40], [41]. The random
process variation can be considered as noise and varied
among the chips fabricated on a single silicon wafer. On
the other hand, the systematic process variation depends
on the quality of the fabrication plant and also related
to the microstructural locality and pattern. The process
variation can lead to different error patterns at a given
reduced latency parameter and can reveal the information
about the fabrication plant and the microstructure.
Our proposed technique of identifying the memory manu-
facturer is based on the following assumptions.
• Assumption on memory class: A manufacturer ships
memory module with a part number on it, which contains
the manufacturer information and chip specification, such
as density, speed grade, package, temperature range,
bus width, die generation, etc. [42]. In addition to part-
number, a manufacturer also provides additional module
specification on the module label [43], such as JEDEC
PCB layout version [44], SPD version [34], manufacturing
country, manufacturing lot number, etc. Timing parameters
of the DRAM module are specified into SPD data [34].
In this work, two DRAM modules are considered as two
different classes, if one of the following information is
mismatched: i) manufacturer, ii) part number, and iii) PCB
layout version/SPD data. A change in one specification
can lead to different GDSIIs (related to the die generation,
and specification), packaging, PCB layouts, or SPD data.
Note that a manufacturer may send a single GDSII file
to different fabrication plants. We assume that fabrication
plants with the same GDSII follow similar design rules
to minimize the effect of systematic process variations.
In this article, ‘sample’, ‘positive sample’, and ‘neg-
ative sample’ mean memory module under test, memory
module that originally belong to the target class, and
memory modules that originally do not belong to the
classifier target class (i.e., belong to the outlier region),
respectively.
• Assumption on data training, and verification: We
extract different features to capture the architectural,
layout, and process variation. These features are trained
to learn a statistical model. In our proposed scheme,
the manufacturer or a trusted party is responsible for
training the statistical model and releasing it for public
use. We also assume that, while training the statistical
model for a particular memory class, manufacturers do
not have any statistical information from other memory
classes (i.e., from negative class). However, in practice,
the manufacturer may collect a few random samples from
other classes. Training statistical model with some negative
examples might be beneficial, but it is almost impossible
to collect all samples from all negative classes because
of the diversity of memory chips/modules and several
manufacturers. We also assume that the chips/modules
that are used for the enrollment in the proposed technique
are authentic. The regular consumers should able to verify
their purchased DRAM class by only using the statistical
model. We also assume that consumers do not have any
knowledge on memory architecture and manufacturing
process.
IV. PROPOSED METHOD
To extract all possible variabilities, we reduce the DRAM
timing latency and obtain the signatures (i.e., the error pattern
or fail bit count) that reflect the architectural, layout, and
process variations. Below, we present a framework to identify
the DRAM class that involves several steps.
Step 1: Data acquisition. The experimental results show
that the latency-induced error pattern depends on the data
written into the memory, the amount of latency reduction, and
the DRAM module [45]. To capture the maximum variations
among the memory classes, we write four different sets of data
to the memory module: (i) Data set 1: solid data pattern (all
1’s), (ii) Data set 2: inverse solid data pattern (all 0’s), (iii)
Data set 3: column stripe data pattern (101010· · · ), (iv) Data
set 4: inverse column stripe data pattern (010101· · · ). Then,
each data set is read back from the DRAM module at the
reduced Activation time (tRCD) to capture module dependent
erroneous outputs.
Step 2: Feature selection. It is crucial to select the optimum
number of features since the performance of classifiers is
sensitive to the choice of the features and features’ attributes
such as correlation, noise, and other factors. In this step, we will
select the key features that can effectively capture architectural,
layout, and process variations observed in DRAM since they
directly impact the accuracy, computation time, and storage
(of golden data) of our proposed technology. The classification
models are created based on a total of 26 features collected
from the four sets of data. Features are extracted from the
whole data that is read out from one page. A single bank from
1GB memory module contains 16k+ pages per bank (eight
banks per module), and for the case of a 2GB memory module,
each bank includes 32k+ pages. Each memory page contains
1,024 words and each word contains 64-bits of data. The data
collected (at reduced tRCD) from each memory pages are then
rearranged into a 1,024×64 (denoted as dR of size w × b,
where, w = number of words in a page, b = number of bits in
each word) binary array. Moreover, for each page, we create
another array, dF (same size of dR) which tracks the location
of flipped bits. Note that, the dF (i, j) = 1, if dR(i, j) is flipped
with respect to the actual data that is written to the DRAM
otherwise, it will be 0. The following features have been chosen
from each page to identify the DRAM origin (i.e., the origin of
the manufacturer and the specification of individual DRAM).
Feature 1 (Ψ1): The total number of flips, also known as
failed bit count (FBC), is used to capture the data dependency,
process variation, and layout variation of the DRAM chips.
The silicon results show that the FBC counts change from one
DRAM module to another module.
Feature 2 (Ψ2): The subset of FBC bits that are flipped to
logic 1.
Feature 3 (Ψ3): The compression ratio (r) depends on the
distribution of ones and zeros in a string (i.e., randomness).
The compression ratio is defined as Eq. 1.
r =
Su
Sc
(1)
Where Su and Sc are the sizes of the uncompressed and
compressed data respectively.
Our preliminary experimental results show that the com-
pression ratio of dR varies from one manufacturer to another.
We compress data using standard ZLIB library [46] and then
compared the data size with the original data. The ZLIB library
is optimized for the minimal computational overhead while
compressing the data.
Feature 4 (Ψ4): The whole block of dF is divided into a
set of smaller blocks (each block is 64× 1 of size and denoted
by Bw). The standard deviation on the FBCs in these Bws
are considered as a feature. This feature captures the spatial
locality of FBC along the dimension w. The higher value of
standard deviation represents a greater spatial locality.
Feature 5 (Ψ5): The block dF is divided into a smaller block,
Bb (of size 1 × 8) and then FBC is counted on each of the
smaller blocks. Then we choose the standard deviation of
those FBCs as the feature Ψ5. The spatial locality along the
dimension b is captured with this feature Ψ5.
Feature 6 (Ψ6): Like Ψ4, we calculate the standard deviation
of FBCs on 64 blocks (of size 1024×1). This feature captures
the fact that some cells of each 64-bit words are more error-
prone than others.
Feature 7 (Ψ7): Like Ψ5, we calculate the standard deviation
of FBCs on 1024 blocks (of size 1×64). This feature explores
the fact that some bitlines are more error-prone than others.
All features except the Ψ2 is extracted from all four data
sets. The feature Ψ2 is only extracted from the dataset 3 and
dataset 4 (see Step 1). Choosing block-size for Ψ4 through
Ψ7 is correlated to the DRAM organization. For example,
we choose a block size of 1 × 8 (Bb) for Ψ5 to capture the
variations among the chips in a DRAM module. Our tested
DRAM modules consist of four or eight chips, and each chip
shares 1, 024 × 16 or 1, 024 × 8 blocks. We use block (Bb)
height of 8 to extract average variations among the chips to
ensure consistency among classes.
Step 3: Machine-learning algorithms for detecting the
DRAM origin. After extracting the most suitable feature,
we develop a machine-learning based technique to identify
counterfeit DRAM modules. In our proposed technique, we
use one-class classifier. Although one-class classifier is a more
complex statistical problem, recent works demonstrated that
it is more advantageous compared to other machine learning
based techniques while detecting counterfeit ICs [8], [47]–[49].
On the other hand, in the traditional binary-class classifier, if
the statistical diversity is enormous in the negative samples,
the classifier might provide poor decision boundary due to
the small negative train data [50], [51]. In such a scenario,
it will be very expensive or even impossible to collect data
from the negative class covering the wide statistical diversity.
This situation is particularly true for counterfeit IC detection
as counterfeit ICs can be introduced from a wide variety of
sources (see Sec. II-B). On the contrary, the one-class classifier
[50]–[54] is trained by only positive class samples. In our
proposed method, we use Support Vector Data Description
(SVDD) [50], [51] to detect the outliers of a specific class.
SVDD creates a spherical decision boundary in feature-space
around the train dataset of a given class. For a given training
data xi ∈ Rn, i = 1, 2, 3, ..., l, Tax et al. [51] solved the
following optimization problem given by Eq. 2.
min
R,a,ξ
R2 + C
l∑
i=1
ξi
subject to, ‖ϕ(x)− a‖2 ≤ R2 + ξi, i = 1, 2, 3, ..., l
ξi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, 3, ..., l
(2)
Here, ξi is a slack variable and ϕ(x) is the mapping function
from the lower dimension to a higher dimension. R and a are
the radius and center of the encircling boundary, and C is the
regularization parameter. A smaller value of C causes more
training samples to be treated as an outlier. A sample will be
considered as an outlier if ‖ϕ(x)− a‖2 > R2. However, Eq.
2 can be efficiently solved by the Eq. 3.
max
α
∑
i
αiKi,i −
∑
i,j
αiαjKi,j
where,
l∑
i=1
αi = 1
(3)
Here, K is the kernel function (i.e., Ki,j = 〈ϕ(xi)T ·ϕ(xj)〉).
In our case, we have chosen the radial basis kernel function
(Eq. 4) [55]. The radial basis function is useful when the data
are not linearly separable.
Ki,j = exp(−γ ‖xi − xj‖2), γ > 0 (4)
In Eq. 4 γ is a free parameter. A larger value of γ enables
the classifier to capture more complex attributes of the training
data. On the other hand, the classifier model might suffer from
overfitting problem if the value of γ is too large. However, the C
and γ can be optimized more efficiently by introducing artificial
outliers and applying k-fold cross-validation [56]. Moreover,
the classifier accuracy can be increased by introducing some
real negative examples during training [51].
Step 4: Constructing a framework to detect DRAM
manufacturer. Fig. 3 presents the proposed framework to
identify the DRAM origin (i.e., the origin of the manufacturer
and the specification of individual DRAM). In the proposed
framework, we assume that the manufacturer or a trusted party
provides the classifier model to the consumer and also defines
a threshold for Positive Page Rate (PPR). The positive page
rate (PPR) is defined as follows-
PPR =
No. of pages that are classified as ‘positive’
No. of test pages from the memory module
(5)
In Fig. 3, the steps, shown in the blue region, are performed
by the OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer), and the steps
shown in the green region are performed at the consumer end.
All other steps (covered by the orange region) can be processed
in either consumers’ system or manufacturers’ system. Initially,
the OEM or a trusted party trains a classifier based on all page
data that are captured from one or multiple DRAM samples of
the target class. The OEM or trusted party should also specify
the number of memory pages that need to be tested from a
memory module to prove its authenticity. Then, based on the
sample statistics, the OEM should choose a threshold (λPPR)
to decide whether a DRAM is manufactured by them or not.
If the PPR from the test module is higher than the threshold,
then the memory module should be considered as authentic.
The selection of the threshold value λPPR and the number
of test pages (n) depend on the quality of the classifier and
the manufacturing process. Higher process variations might
cause a large statistical diversity on the manufactured memory
modules and may increase the chance of miss-classification.
Besides, a larger process variation may lead to a higher
statistical variation among the memory pages from the same
DRAM module. In such a case, we might need more randomly
sampled memory pages (i.e., a larger value of n) to capture all
architectural and manufacturing process variations of a DRAM
module. The choice of λPPR mostly depends on the quality
of classifier. Fig. 4a shows that the distribution of PPR from
positive samples and negative samples have an overlapping
region. In such case, it is not possible to select a λPPR that
creates a clear boundary between the positive samples and
the negative samples. On the other hand, if the distribution of
the PPR is mutually exclusive (Fig. 4b), selecting a λPPR
within the interval [PPRneg,max, PPRpos,min] will separate
positive and negative samples. Therefore, the ideal goal should
be, maximizing the separation between PPRneg,max and
PPRpos,min for a suitable value of λPPR during classification.
As it is difficult/impossible to collect the negative class data
that covers the whole distribution (discussed in Step 3), the
λPPR should be defined with the highest possible value (i.e.,
λPPR,op = PPRpos,min). In our proposed scheme, the OEM
should train a classifier Cm, corresponding to a specific memory
class and make the classifier parameter public. Then, the user
should choose random n test pages from the memory module
that is under test. The general information given with the
classifier Cm should enable the user to extract features form
those selected pages. Then, for each of those n test pages, the
OEM/user should test the extracted features using the classifier
Cm. If the PPR (calculated from Eq. 5) is higher than the
threshold λPPR, the memory module should be marked as
authentic. Otherwise, it should be identified as a counterfeit
one.
Y
Train classifier Cm Select Random 
n pages 
Test extracted features with classifier Cm
Compute Positive Page Rate (tPPR)
tPPR > λPPR ?
Authentic Counterfeit
Extract Features from 
selected pages
select a threshold 
λPPR  and n
OEM Consumer end
OEM/Consumer end
yes no
Fig. 3: The proposed framework that is used to prove the
authenticity of the origin of the DRAM manufacturer along
with specification.
V. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In our experiment, we have collected data from 25 com-
mercial off-the-shelf single rank DDR3 SODIMMs (small
outline dual in-line memory module) from 3 major DRAM
manufacturers (see Table 1) [17]. We have tagged the memory
class based on the part number, the Garber version (reference
PCB layout version [44]), and the SPD [34] data (see Table 1).
Among the first six classes, we found at least one mismatch in
their SPD data (detailed of SPD data is not presented in this
article). On the other hand, the last two classes only differed by
their PCB layout version and SPD version. From each memory
module, we have collected data from all memory banks (each
DRAM module contains eight banks). The testing platform
has been implemented using a Xilinx Virtex ML605 evaluation
board with SoftMC [57]. Data have been written and fetched
from the DRAM memory module with two 32-byte data bursts.
For all memory modules, we have observed error patterns
below 7.5ns of Activation time (the recommended Activation
time is in between 10ns to 15ns [18]). In this work, we have
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Fig. 4: Selecting λ for case- (a) when the distribution of
PPRneg and PPRpos are overlapped, (b) when the
distribution of PPRneg and PPRpos are mutually exclusive.
conducted our experiment with a 5ns of Activation time which
should be achievable by most of the system. In order to quantify
the robustness of our proposed technique, we have evaluated
our proposed method in four different operating condition- i)
nominal voltage (1.5v) and room temperature (25°C) (NVRT),
ii) high voltage and room temperature (HVRT), iii) low voltage
and room temperature (LVRT), and iv) nominal voltage and
high temperature (NVHT). For HVRT and LVRT, we have
changed the input voltage (VDD) by ±1% as most of the
memory controllers limit the voltage ripple within ±1% [58].
For NVHT, we have changed the operating temperature by
+15°C from the room temperature.
Manufacturer
Part
Name †
Country
Origin Quantity
SPD-Garber
Version
Class
tag
Micron
M1 China 2 10-C1 1
M2 Singapore 3 10-B1 2
China 4
Samsung
S1 China 1 10-B1 3
S2 China 1 11-B2 4
S3 China 4 11-B2 5
Philippines 3
SK Hynix H1
Korea 5 10-B1 6
China 1 11-B2 7
Korea 1
TABLE I: Memory modules used in the data set.
†M1: MT4JSF12864HZ-1G4D1, M2: MT8JSF12864HZ-1G4F1, S1:
M471B2873EH1-CF8, S2: M471B2873GB0-CH9, S3: M471B5773DH0-CH9,
H1: HMT325S6BFR8C-H9;
M1, M2, S2: 1GB 1333MT/s, S1: 1GB 1066MT/s, S3, H1: 2GB 1333MT/s
Fig. 5 presents the spatial locality of failed bits in a randomly
chosen page form each memory class at NVRT operating
condition. From the scatter plot, we observe that the error
pattern is different for different classes. Note that, the PCB
layout version only differs class 6 and class 7 and the subtle
difference is difficult to understand from the figure (Fig. 5a).
In Fig. 5b, we have presented the spatial locality of failed bits
on two random pages from the same memory module of the
same class. Although there is some similarity in their texture,
the pattern is not consistent. The features extracted from these
samples (as discussed in Sec. IV) are still capable of separating
these classes.
From each memory page, we have extracted a total of 26
features as described in Sec. IV. We have applied these 26
features directly to train and test the classifier. However, we
have used the Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA), a linear
transformation [59], to provide the best visualization of the class
separability. The LDA projects the data into a lower dimension
feature-space by keeping the maximum separability among
the classes. In the LDA, the lower dimension and the higher
dimension features are linearly dependent. The data distribution
in lower dimension feature-space is presented in Fig. 6. In
this figure, we have only considered the most significant 5
dimensions (Φ1,Φ2,Φ3,Φ4, and Φ5) in the new feature-space
that provides the maximum separability (explained variance).
From the figure, we observe that each of the class forms a
cluster in the feature space, which enables the separation of
manufacturers.
To demonstrate our proposed method, we trained one-class
SVDD classifier (as discussed in Sec. IV) for each class where
we assume that the manufacturer does not have any prior
knowledge of the memory modules from other class (See
Sec. III). The classifier was only trained at NVRT operating
condition, and the same classifier was used to test the data
from other operating conditions. Training one class classifier is
a more complex statistical problem compared to the multi-class
problem. We used LIBSVM library to implement the one class
classifier [60]. For each class, we selected only one module to
train the classifier (using 26 features from all pages collected
at NVRT condition) and then tested all the pages from the rest
of the 24 modules with the trained classifier with all operating
conditions.
To validate our algorithm, we have chosen all possible
combinations of training and testing data sets. In Table II,
we have presented the result from the one-class classifier.
The third, fourth, and fifth columns of the table represent the
mean, the standard deviation, and the minimum PPR from
the positive samples for each classifier (PPR is calculated
from each test module). The sixth, seventh, and eighth columns
of the table represent the mean, the standard deviation, and
the maximum PPR from the negative samples. For the ideal
case, the PPRpos and PPRneg should be 100% and 0%
respectively. The standard deviation for both cases should be
0%. A larger gap between the PPRpos and PPRneg provides
us the flexibility of choosing appropriate values of λPPR and
n for identifying the origin of the manufacturers along with
specification with high confidence (Sec. IV). Our silicon results
provide a satisfactory difference between the PPRpos and
PPRneg , which can be further improved by learning statistical
(a) (b)
Fig. 5: (a) Spatial locality of failed bits from a randomly chosen page from each class,
(b) Spatial locality of randomly chosen two pages from same memory modules.
Fig. 6: Visualizing data in feature-space.
model with more positive samples and/or introducing negative
samples. Table II also presents that a small change in voltage
and temperature has a very insignificant effect on classifier
performance. This is expected because a small change in voltage
or temperature has a negligible effect on Activation time. [13],
[14], [36], [61].
A suspicious DRAM module: From the results shown
in Table 3, for class 1, we observe that the PPRpos is
0% (the ideal PPRpos is 100%). Note that we have two
samples available for this class: one is used for training, and
another one is for testing. Therefore, we suspect that one of
them is counterfeit. Fig. 7a presents the spatial locality of
failed bits from 2 random pages from those two samples.
The results show that they have distinct FBC properties.
Furthermore, the dissimilarities found in visual inspection (Fig.
7b) suggests that one of them might be counterfeit (i.e., from
a fake manufacturer). The layout difference between these two
modules suggests that the reference layout version should be
different for these two modules. However, the reference layout
version is described as ‘C1’ on both modules’ label. From
the SPD data, we have found that the reference raw card (i.e.,
layout) version is specified as ‘C’ (which represents- ‘C0’,
‘C1’, ‘C2’ etc.) for both modules. For further investigation,
we have checked the layout provided by the JEDEC [44] and
found that the second module layout version is ‘C2’ instead
of ‘C1’ (as shown in Fig. 7b). Therefore, we conclude that
the second module is either from the fake manufacturer or
mislabeled (with layout version ‘C1’).
VI. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Our proposed method can be used to detect various coun-
terfeit types. However, the proposed work cannot identify
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Fig. 7: (a) Spatial locality of erroneous bits of 2 random pages of each sample from Class 1,
(b) Visual appearance of each sample from Class 1 (Module 2 is suspicious).
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NVRT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.26 1.77
HVRT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.20 1.37
LVRT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.22 1.51
NVHT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.31 2.08
2
NVRT 99.07 1.16 95.40 0.00 0.02 0.17
HVRT 98.04 3.54 87.60 0.00 0.01 0.10
LVRT 99.09 0.98 96.49 0.00 0.02 0.19
NVHT 99.33 0.58 97.53 0.00 0.01 0.07
3*
NVRT − − − 0.00 0.01 0.06
HVRT − − − 0.00 0.01 0.06
LVRT − − − 0.00 0.01 0.05
NVHT − − − 0.00 0.01 0.07
4*
NVRT − − − 0.00 0.00 0.00
HVRT − − − 0.00 0.00 0.00
LVRT − − − 0.00 0.00 0.00
NVHT − − − 0.00 0.00 0.00
5
NVRT 84.19 6.92 59.79 0.38 1.02 6.8
HVRT 84.74 7.16 59.31 0.41 1.10 7.19
LVRT 84.19 6.06 60.92 0.40 1.02 6.7
NVHT 82.56 7.63 57.00 0.38 1.03 6.96
6
NVRT 90.29 9.31 69.58 1.58 4.16 25.91
HVRT 90.35 9.39 68.98 1.54 4.14 25.78
LVRT 81.98 9.49 69.74 1.69 4.52 28.65
NVHT 90.32 9.31 69.17 1.52 3.80 23.64
7
NVRT 73.81 10.46 66.41 1.56 4.73 21.72
HVRT 74.22 9.36 68.11 1.61 4.91 22.98
LVRT 71.55 14.67 61.18 1.56 4.75 21.19
NVHT 76.01 6.53 71.39 1.53 4.72 22.15
*For class 3 and class 4, we have only one sample which is used to train the
statistical model. There is no positive test sample left for these two classes.
TABLE II: Results from the one-class classifier.
overproduction from the same foundry [5]. In the future, we
will extend our technique for other volatile and non-volatile
memory chips (e.g., flash memory, SRAM, etc. [62], [63]).
Selecting a robust set of features to improve the accuracy might
be another direction of our current research. In such a case,
we might need to use more than one entropy source to capture
a better variance among classes. In this article, we have only
used data error obtained at the reduced activation latency.
Since our current work only exploits the learning ability
of a one-class classifier, we will explore additional machine
learning techniques, such as ensemble learning and classifier
fusion, for improved generalization across a broader set of
manufacturers in future work. We will also explore additional
features and filtering, wrapper, and embedded feature analysis
techniques to better understand the impact of each feature on
identifying a DRAM manufacturer.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a simple non-invasive and low-
cost scheme for identifying the origin of a DRAM manufacturer
and verifying individual DRAM’s specification. The proposed
method exploits the DRAM latency variations to capture the
architectural, layout, and process variations. At first, we chose
the most appropriate features from the DRAM signature, and
then we used a one-class classifier to verify the memory class
without knowing the information from other classes (i.e., other
manufacturers).
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